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IAC-05-E6.2.01
THE SKY IS THE LIMIT - BUT WHERE DOES IT END?
New Developments On the Issue of Delimitation of Outer Space
Frans G. von der Dunk
International Institute of Air and Space Law, Leiden - The Netherlands
F.G. vonderDunk@law.leidenuniv.nl

one, other legally relevant means are
sought to deal with the issue.
Secondly, such development of
alternate means has, in turn, its own
indirect impact at the international
legal plane. Such various developments
as Australian national law referring to a
lower boundary for outer space and the
need to choose for certification of
SpaceShipOne and crew may, in the
end, through the mechanism of
formation of international custom and
opinio juris, lead to a customary legal
rule.
The current paper thus, firstly, briefly
recapitulates the discussion of the last
decades on delimitation and definition
of outer space, secondly, refers to a few
events which directly touch upon this
issue, thirdly, tries to analyse the legal
aspects of the solutions chosen to deal
with that, including the vexing question
of formation of customary law, and
finally tries to draw some conclusions
with respect to the overarching
question: if the sky is the limit, where
does it end?

Abstract
The discussion on the delimitation, and
hence definition of 'outer space' as an
area, and subsidiary to that on the need
or desirability to have such a
delimitation and definition, harks back
to the beginning of the space age. Until
then, it had been quite clear that every
state exercised full sovereignty over the
sky above its territory and territorial
waters, whilst no one felt the need for
finding out how high upward such
sovereignty would exactly extend.
With Sputnik, for the first time the
practical question arose however
whether there indeed was an upper
limit to airspace, and if so, where it
would lie. The debate since then has
mainly been a theoretical one, partly
because several important space-faring
nations did not consider it necessary or
even appropriate to establish a legally
relevant fixed boundary between 'outer
space' and 'airspace' as 'geographical'
areas for human activities.
It is the main thrust of this paper,
firstly, that this situation is changing. It
is contended that in particular the
recent adventures of SpaceShipOne
which for a brief moment 'dipped' into
outer space - if one agrees that outer
space begins at an altitude of 100 km bring the question of where 'outer
space' begins back on the table.
Consequently, wherever that question
is indeed considered relevant, in the
absence of any international agreement
on such a delimitation or definition,
viz. the need or desirability to establish

1. Introduction
In October 2004, a privately-paid, -built
and -piloted vehicle by the name of
SpaceShipOne achieved a major feat winning the X-prize ofUS$ 10 million,
as well as getting thousands to sign up,
in its aftermath, for a place in Sir
Richard Branson's future Virgin
Galactic seats for a trip higher upwards
than any aircraft has ever flown. I
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It soon turned out, however, that the
newly-established Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
(COPUOS) could not establish any
consensus on the boundary question.
Different states (and different experts,
legal as well as non-legal) came
forward with different proposals as to
where the legal borderline would have
to be drawn, variously based on
scientific
and/or
practical
considerations. Some adherents of a
'spatialist' approach, in addition, made
a case for a more subtle zoning system,
creating (an) intennediate space(s)
between air space and outer space
properly speaking, with combined or
mixed characteristics. Even more
importantly, amongst others some of
the
major
space-faring
nations
considered establishment of a boundary
premature, to say the least. They were
hesitant to create artificial legal
boundaries as long as the possibility of
later
technological
developments
ignoring a particular boundary chosen
continued to loom large. More
principally, finally, there were the
adherents of full-fledged 'functionalist'
theories, arguing that the application of
the one or the other system of law
should hinge only on the purpose of the
activity and the characterisation of the
hardware involved - air law for aircraft,
space law for space objects.
As long as those vehicles that would
clearly qualify only as aircraft remained
at altitudes far below the lowest orbits
that other vehicles clearly qualifying as
space objects could maintain, and as
long as any trajectory of the latter to
(and from) their orbits would not run
through another state's sovereign
airspace, the question remained, indeed,
a theoretical one.
Nevertheless, from time to time it
raised its head. Thus, the absence of
any established legal boundary may
have been partly responsible for a

Behind all the excitement and the
discussions as to what this means for
the future of space travel and space
activities more in general, it also raised
once more a question hitherto largely
considered to be of a theoretical nature:
where does outer space begin? Where
would the territorial sovereignty of the
underlying state, providing an easy
legal tool for controlling such activities,
extinguish; where by contrast would a
different legal approach be necessary
for controlling purposes in what
basically
constitutes
a
global
commons?

2. Legal history
Many experts have discussed where
outer space begins (often as part of the
broader issue of the definition of outer
space) ever since 1957. In that year, the
orbits of Sputnik I posed the vexing
question as to whether individual states
could 'use' their well-established
sovereignty over the airspace above
their territories2 to prohibit man-made
space objects to be present above such
territories.
The quick fonnalisation of one of the
fundamental rules of international space
law, that outer space itself remained
outside any sovereignty as a terra
communis,3 seemed to reinforce the
need to establish a clear boundary
between the two areas subject to
regimes with such fundamental
differences. Precedents could be
derived from the discussion on the law
of the sea. The 1958 treaties negotiated
in Geneva dealt with the demarcation of
territorial seas (where the sovereignty
of the coastal
states
applied
comprehensively, with the exception of
the famed 'right of innocent passage')
versus high seas (which were basically
open to all states and regulated only at
the internationallevel).4
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conclusion that the space shuttle was
equivalent to a spacecraft (space
object). This meant, inter alia, its
launches would be registered under the
Registration Convention 7, not under the
applicable ICAO regime. No other state
protested, so that one can now safely
assume that, indeed, the space shuttle
legally speaking is a spacecraft. All
this, however, of course did not solve
the delimitation issue as such.

handful of equatorial countries claiming
in 1976, through the famous Bogota
Declaration, that those parts of the geostationary orbit (at an altitude of some
35,800 km) which were 'above' their
respective territories were subject to
their respective sovereignty. Apart from
difficult legal arguments pertaining to
the physical similarities between the
geo-stationary orbit and the areas
surrounding it
which nobody
contested were outer space - it was in
particular the political opposition of the
large majority of non-equatorial states
which, in the end, caused such claims
to be silently discarded or at least
watered down fundamentally.5
Then, there was the advent of the space
shuttle in the 80's: a vehicle that
functioned partly as a space object,
partly as an aircraft. And while the US
version,
operating
ever
since,
apparently never traversed the airspaces
over foreign states on its way to or from
orbit (which few would contest was in
outer space, regardless of the absence
of any borderline), the Soviet Buran,
which flew only once, did have to
return over various African countries
and Turkey at altitudes which could
arguably be seen as upper airspaces of
those states - defined in a recent Study
by the International Academy of
Astronautics (lAA) by reference to a
100 km altitude. 6
The Buran flight was unmanned, and
never repeated afterwards anyhow, so
the United States had to make their own
choice regarding how to treat the space
shuttle in legal terms. Focusing on the
shuttle's aim of taking humans into
outer space and back rather than to and
from a different spot on earth, its being
launched instead of taking off, the large
phase where it effectively continued to
operate as a spacecraft, as well as the
desirability of qualifying its crew as
astronauts rather than pilots, the US
government quickly came to the

3. International discussions COPUOS and the ITU
Thus, from time to time discussions in
the Legal Subcommittee of COPUOS
reverted back to the issue of
delimitation. For example first the
Soviet Union, then Russia, repeatedly
put proposals on the table to come to an
agreement of legally establishing the
boundary at an altitude of 100 km. The
rationale for choosing that altitude,
apart from the nice round figure, was
mainly that aircraft, as the main subject
matter of most of international (as well
as national) air law, would never be
able to reach such altitudes in view of
their dependency, for purposes of lift,
upon a density of air not available in
those regions. Conversely, space
objects orbiting the earth (a major
target for space law) could not sensibly
do that below such an altitude, as the
atmosphere from their perspective was
too dense for staying 'up' in their orbit,
the attendant atmospheric drag no
longer being compensated by the
centrifugal forces resulting from their
velocity. 8 Still, such discussions did not
lead to any agreement for reasons
indicated earlier.
Debate on the issue resurfaced once
more when the Legal Subcommittee
addressed a questionnaire to its member
states on the issue of 'aerospace
planes,.9 This conceptual follow-up to
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space shuttles would enjoy double
functionality (as aircraft transporting
passengers from city to city, as
spacecraft orbiting a satellite or taking
crew to or from the space station) and
hybrid operationality (using jet
propulsion when in airspace, rocket
propulsion when in outer space), which
brought the debate on spatialismversus-functionalist back to the table and in its wake also the question of
delimitation and definition of outer
space and such sub-issues as existence
of a possible 'right of innocent passage'
for spacecraft through another state's
airspace.
The particular Russian proposal to deal
with the issue was presented in 1992,
the questionnaire drafted on the basis
thereof distributed in 1995, and the first
comprehensive analysis of the replies
presented in a note by the COPUOS
Secretariat two years later still. IO Even
more tellingly, the response was
considered to be rather meagre at the
time (at that point only 15 states having
taken the trouble of answering), and the
questionnaire remained on the agenda
basically until today. I I
Summarily surveying the answers that
were provided, the views remained as
varied as they had been before. Yet, on
a number of occasions it became clear
that states continued to struggle with
the issue of respective application of air
law and space law. A few points were
specifically worthy of note from this
perspective.
Firstly, Pakistan referred to "altitudes
lower than between 90 and 100 km",
where a spacecraft was "bound to decay
within the next orbit" and thus, in the
language of the COPUOS Secretariat's
summary, would make it "subject to
rules of air law".12
Secondly, the Russian Federation
"observed that international practice
( ... ) was evolving, whereby State
sovereignty did not extend to space

located above the orbit of least perigee
of an artificial Earth satellite
(approximately 100 kilometres above
sea level). In cases where flights have
occurred below this level, State have
furnished, on the basis of goodwill,
relevant information to States whose
territory was overflown".13 Relevant
"provisions of international customary
law in this field were evolving",
according to the same state. 14
Germany finally adorned an extended
analysis of re-entry trajectories of the
US space shuttle with an interesting
graphical depiction. It showed the area
between 100 and 60 km altitude as a
shaded zone (the lower altitude being
referred to as being a mere 14-15
minutes before touchdown), placing the
entry below a 100 km altitude at about
30 minutes prior to touchdown, and in
the accompanying text equating this to
"re-entry
into
the
Earth's
atmosphere".15 It needs to be added
here, that a relatively large number of
states in their answers referred to "the
atmosphere" as the area where (as far
as spatialism was applied or considered
to apply) air law would rule.
To wrap up the summary picture at the
international level, as indicated another
area of international law where
discussions on the delimitation and
definition had, at some time, been
rather
intense
concerned
the
geostationary orbit. Here, the Bogota
Declaration of 1976 forced states to
face the claim that parts of the
geostationary orbit, almost 36,000 km
out, were basically part of the sovereign
territory of the underlying state.
This discussion for a large part took
place in the context of the ITU, in view
of the paramount role of the ITU in
coordinating the use of slots in that
orbit for satellite communication
purposes. It is noteworthy, therefore,
that the ITU Radio Regulations in the
definition section (Article S 1) was also
87

international authoritative statement in
this respect from becoming possible.
At the same time, this did not erase the
abovementioned need and desire for
particular states to deal with private
space activities by means of national
law; and when states can find no
authoritative international guidance on
the issue, they go and find a solution on
their own - with all the possible
fragmentation resulting.
In trying to establish legal control over
relevant private space activities,
furthermore, there is an inherent
tendency for states to base themselves
on 'spatialist' notions. Whereas a
private person or company would be
likely to prefer a legal approach which
combines all applicable rules to his
activity in one handy regime, regardless
of what takes place where (in other
words, would prefer a 'functionalist'
regime as much as possible), a state
will be naturally inclined to delineate
its competencies and the exercise
thereof principally by means of
geographical
borders.
Territorial
sovereignty and territorial jurisdiction,
more important and effective than all
other forms of jurisdiction, are key to a
state's existence, and any particular
state is even defined in international
law by reference to a territory over
which it exercises effective control. The
history of inter-state disputes is replete
with disagreements over territorial
borders, which started to include the
seas and oceans as soon as borders
became applied to those areas as well.
When states, therefore, consider
implementing national space law to
apply the international space treaties on
the domestic plane, naturally they tend
to use territorial jurisdiction to define
the scope of such laws. With it, at least
in theory, comes a desire to delineate
where such jurisdiction applies. And
indeed, amongst the states so far having
dealt with domestic legislation, several

confronted with the need to deal with
this issue. Thus, a "space station" for
lTV purposes was defined to be "an
object which is beyond, is intended to
go beyond, or has been beyond the
major portion of the Earth's
atmosphere".16 Likewise, in defining a
"spacecraft" reference was made to that
- rather vague and unhelpful definition of what 'space' should be
taken to mean. 17
One can hardly blame the lTV however
for not being more precise when at the
general international level states were
unable to agree even on the need for a
specific definition and/or delimitation
of outer space. The result, however,
was that the attendant insecurity and
imprecision still remained.

4. National (space) law on the issue
Apart from the discussions within
UNCOPVOS and the ITV, that is at the
international level, the issue of
delimitation of (national) airspace and
(everybody's) outer space also became
a matter for deliberation at the level of
national law. With the growing private
involvement in space and space-related
activities especially since the late 80's,
states were increasingly confronted
with the need to legally monitor and
control such private activities and
started developing national space laws
to deal with them.
In a number of crucial respects there is
no detailed international guidance
regarding
how
to
implement
international duties on the domestic
plane - also pertaining, as briefly
analysed above, to the issue of
delimitation. Not only on a particular
borderline between air space and outer
space, but even on the need to have
one, states diverged fundamentally in
their opinions so as to preclude any
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"launch", "return" and "space object". 23
In 2002, however, the Act was
amended. Henceforth, the definitions of
"launch", "return" and "space object"
replaced the reference to "outer space"
with the phrase "an area beyond the
distance of 100 km above mean sea
level".24
The Australian authorities explicitly
claimed this clear reference not to
constitute any precedent or to prejudge
in any sense the discussion at the
international level - it was supposed to
be a boundary for internal, domestic
purposes only. 25 In other words: the
Australian government excused itself
for considering it necessary to quote a
borderline for domestic legislative
purposes, and kept its options open to
immediately change that provision if
ever it would be authoritatively agreed
upon at the international level to
establish a different boundary, or to not
establish any boundary at all.
From a customary law perspective
these developments certainly raise the
question whether, at the national level,
acceptance is slowly building that (a)
some legal boundary will ultimately be
necessary for states to create the legal
certainty both they themselves and their
private entrepreneurs crave for, and (b)
that such a boundary would or should
be situated at an altitude of 100 km or
so. To the extent such acceptance
becomes part of law and regulation, and
would be expressed in addition by
relevant official statements in COPUOS
and/or the answers to COPUOS
questionnaires moreover, it could then
certainly come to constitute the state
practice and contribute to the opinio
juris as the two elements that together
make up customary law. Perhaps more
thorough research would unearth more
growing acceptance still, but at any rate
a trend seems to become visible.
So far, so good - one could still wonder
to what extent such a precise borderline

have considered themselves forced to
somehow deal with the issue of
delimitation and definition of outer
space - much as others have simply
chosen, for the time being, to
circumvent it. 18
For example in Germany, where the
potential need for licensing private
spacecraft has not yet led to a distinct
national space law, the Federal German
Aviation Code in § 1(2) provides that
"spacecraft, rockets and similar flying
objects are regarded as aircraft as long
as they are in airspace", with the result
of course that the other provisions of
the Code then become applicable. 19
As a matter of fact, already the very
first national act on space, the 1958 US
Act establishing NASA, defines
"space" with a view to "space
activities" as the area "outside the
earth's atmosphere".2o The atmosphere,
it can be reiterated, is seen by many
states and experts as equivalent to the
area where air law applies. Until
recently, the national space law coming
closest to properly dealing with the
issue was the South African one, where
"outer space" was defined as "the space
above the surface of the earth from a
height at which it is in practice possible
to operate an object in an orbit around
the earth".21 Keeping in mind amongst
others the relevant statement taken
from the Pakistani answer to the
COPUOS questionnaire as quoted
above, this would seem to point at a
borderline at some 90 to 100 km
altitude indeed, even if the South
African government carefully refrained
from quoting any figure on this.
This last - bold - step was taken by the
Australian government. The original
1998 Act 22 did not yet include any
figure, or even an attempt to define
outer space, along the lines of the
Pakistani answer or the South-African
Act. "Outer space" was simply referred
to as such, e.g. in the definitions of
89

jurisdiction on the basis of US territory
being used for the launch alternatively
US registration of the space object, and
not on the basis of its being in US
airspace (which would directly have
triggered the haunting perspective that
private business, in every instance
where the US government would
determine such a boundary in such a
manner as to encapsulate the whole
flight within its national airspace for
purposes of exerclsmg territorial
jurisdiction, would respond by sending
space tourists higher yet precisely
because these tourists want to be in
outer space!).
So far, indeed the US authorities have
followed
such
an
approach.
SpaceShipOne almost of necessity was
given an ad hoc-treatment, but the
perspective of more prizes, more
private flights and certainly more and
more passengers lining up and paying
up with Sir Richard Branson coaxed the
US government into more substantial
legislative action.
The result so far was, essentially, the
Commercial
Space
Launch
26
Amendments Act of2004. It amended
the various relevant Sections of the
existing part of the US Code (Title 49)
on launch activities and space
transportation27, to the extent of adding
the concepts of "space flight
participants", "suborbital trajectory"
and "permit" (in addition to the existing
concept of "license"), all to cater for the
general inclusion of SpaceShipOne-like
flights in the licensing regime of the
Act. 28 In addition, "experimental
permits" could now also be handed out,
the main difference being that this last
category could not apply to flights
"carrying any property or human being
for compensation or hire", only to
flights preparing for such events.29
In both cases, effectively a waiver from
the Section on "liability insurance and
financial responsibility requirements,,30

made sense from a practical point of
view, that is: had any realistic effect on
the handling by governments of
relevant space activities.

5. SpaceShipOne
and recent US legal activities
All that changed with a Big Bang in
October 2004 with the X-prize being
won. This was not just about 'a' private
space activity requiring some form of
legal control not necessarily having to
deal with any boundary between
airspace and outer space. Here, that
boundary was key to the whole
undertaking. After all, the decisive winning - element of SpaceShipOne's
achievement was its presence twice
within three weeks above an altitude
broadly advertised as 'in outer space' an altitude expressly quantified as 100
km. Of course, a mere advertisement by
a private company cannot achieve the
feat of constituting or establishing a
fact of (international) customary law.
But one is immediately reminded of
NASA awarding astronaut status to
those having been further away from
the earth's surface than 100 km.
So the achievements of SpaceShipOne
immediately raised assorted questions
as to the legal treatment of similar
ventures - trips - in the future (first
with Virgin Galactic, then probably
with others as well), in this case from
within US jurisdiction - which does,
however, not extend to outer space in
the same manner as it extends to US
airspace; so where does the one begin
and the other end?
Of course, the US government could
maintain its legal approach and refuse
to refer to any specific borderline in its
domestic legislation. It could well treat
any private flight launched from US
territory as just another launch, the
spacecraft involved being subject to US
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was construed, allowing a 'permittee'
or 'experimental permittee' to forego
expensive insurance - at the price of
informing crew and space flight
participants of the absence of US
certification of the spacecraft and the
attendant risks in flying to outer space,
allowing such passengers to take their
own risk-abating measures if they
would so desire. 31
In other words, for the time being a
light regulatory regime was established
to stimulate the take-off of private
spaceflight activities in the wake of
SpaceShipOne without fundamentally
changing the underlying philosophy
that it would be premature to establish
any borderline between (US) airspace
and outer space. For the time being, as
the period of application of the
Commercial
Space
Launch
Amendments Act specifically allowed
the Secretary of Transportation as of
eight years from its enactment to
propose new safety regulations, takin§
the then-state of play into account. 3
Also, the Commercial Space Launch
Amendments Act specifically calls for
studies on risk sharing, international
competition and safety issues, with a
view to allowing updates of the Act if
US private space tourism is to be
protected or otherwise re-regulated. 33

territory. Launches conducted from
elsewhere overflying US territory, once
becoming seriously possible, could no
longer be legally controlled in that way
as long as they would not fly at such a
low altitude that no one would contest
this to be US airspace, that is below a
zone where it will be difficult or even
impossible for a spacecraft to operate.
Already in regard of Sir Richard
Branson it might be noted that he is a
UK citizen, and Virgin Galactic has
been established in the United
Kingdom. In other words: that state
may soon have to be less evasive than
'defining' "outer space" merely as to
"include( ... ) the moon and other
celestial bodies". 34 Will the United
Kingdom, or for that matter the Russian
Federation (whose Mir space station
had after all in 2001 constituted the
original target for the first space touristever Dennis Tito) - both not the least
amongst the space-faring nations! - be
tempted to follow the Australian
example, in view of all the other
references to 100 km altitude collected
in the present paper? Australia may
have modestly and explicitly limited
the scope of its own delimitation so as
to preclude anyone from perceiving this
to provide some form of precedent - if
other states would copy such a 'nonprecedent' (which, after all, will not
have come about totally arbitrarily)
Australia obviously cannot stop them,
and the country nolens volens may have
provided a basis for establishment of a
relevant customary rule.
And what happens if a state clinging to
non-delimitation would find a foreignregistered, foreign-launched private
passenger spacecraft to be present
vertically above its territory at an
altitude
neither
unequivocally
considered airspace nor unequivocally
considered outer space? Would it feel
itself entitled to apply for example tort
law on a territorial basis to liability

6. Towards the future ...
The main question is, then: is this
current approach going to remain
sufficient?
The
United
States
government may well have avoided the
establishment of any boundary between
airspace and outer space, creating what
amounts to a functionally-based regime
for space tourism whilst using its
territorial jurisdiction over the launch
site, but that might work satisfactorily
only as long as such launches would
take place exclusively from US
91

that international area) and the
sovereign area of national airspaces. In
other words, it is time to seriously
reconsider whether we should not
firmly but flexibly establish the
boundary between airspaces and outer
space at an altitude of 100 km,
following the considerable number of
instances where this number has
already been referred to. After all, what
is wrong with a nice round figure?

issues possibly arising? Or would it be
content to wait and see whether its
interests, persons or property would
actually be harmed? And if that, in tum,
would mean any event vertically above
its territory might become subject to its
jurisdiction, would that not stifle the
interests in a flourishing private space
industry? What if other nations start
applying
similar
all-out
legal
approaches on a basis of reciprocity?
Ultimately, the development of private
space flight depends on legal certainty
and predictability. Now that the means
to unequivocally establish one's
position in three dimensions relative to
the earth with GPS, GLONASS and
soon Galileo are within everyone's
reach, should we not work towards an
agreement on establishing a boundary
line before possible legal disputes
would become a nasty political reality?
Over the past centuries, global fishing,
global shipping transport and sea-based
communications
have
flourished
immensely partly because a certain
Hugo Grotius proclaimed the freedom
of the high seas - which needed a
determination where those high seas
began and ended. Notwithstanding that
those boundaries have shifted over
time, have become more complex with
in-between zones and have led to a
number of border disputes; who is to
deny that the absence of an off-shore
non-tangible boundary out at sea would
have produced far worse results?
Perhaps the sky is the limit to private
spaceflight in economic terms, but if
the legal certainty and justice is to be
ensured which allows for a beneficial
and balanced development thereof, we
should delineate - and hence limit! the extent to which territorial
jurisdiction could reach for the sky. We
should finally start working on a
boundary between the 'high seas' of
outer space (and then provide for an
appropriate transportation regime for
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